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Sanctions imposed by the United States and its partners 
against Iran’s oil sector have had a major impact in 
debilitating both the sector itself  and the broader 
economy. It is likely that this sector will be the target of  
additional pressure should the international sanctions 
campaign against Iran be renewed in full. 
Leaving aside the current political debate over whether 
new US sanctions should be imposed on Iran or 
threatened in law at this moment in time, it is critical to 
consider what impact such sanctions would actually have 
on Iran, Iran’s customers, and oil markets in general. 
Though some argue that the United States could re-create 
its success from 2012–2013 in imposing high costs on 
Iran, this is not guaranteed, and changes in oil markets, 
the international environment more generally, and Iran’s 
response to sanctions pressure will have a bearing on both 
the effect of  more sanctions and their utility. 
This briefing examines the recent history of  Iran oil 
sanctions and seeks to draw lessons for their renewed 
application to date. In short, I find:
• It may be possible to achieve steeper cuts in Iran’s 
oil exports in the event of  a renewed sanctions 
campaign following a collapse in ongoing nuclear 
negotiations between Iran and the members 
of  the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
coordinated by the European Union).
• Steeper cuts would be predicated both on the 
continued oversupply of  oil markets from non-
Iranian sources and the collapse of  the process 
being blamed on Iran (or, at a minimum, not 
definitively blamed on the P5+1).
• However, the overall impact on Iran from both 
the economic and political perspectives may be 
less than anticipated by its advocates because 
of  the resiliency of  the Iranian economy, its 
diversified export sectors, the low price of  oil and 
relatively high value of  non-oil exports to Iran, 
and the restricted cash reserve that sanctions 
have forced Iran to build abroad.
• Given this, as well as Iran’s usual “resistance” 
approach to international pressure and general 
readiness to advance its nuclear program in 
response to new sanctions, an appropriate 
sanctions approach to take would require both 
a broader and a deeper reach into the Iranian 
economy. Still, such an effort would be—in 
effect—a bet being laid by the P5+1, in general, 
and by the United States, in particular, that 
Iran’s response would—in time—be positive in 
the face of  additional pressure. This cannot be 
guaranteed and is, at best, speculation by all sides 
of  the debate.
EXECUTIVE SUmmARY
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INTROdUCTION
Sanctions imposed by the United States and its partners 
against Iran’s oil sector have had a major impact in 
debilitating both the sector itself  and the broader 
economy. It is likely that this sector will be the target of  
additional pressure should the international sanctions 
campaign against Iran be renewed in full. US Senate 
bill 269 (S. 269), which was sent to the floor at the end 
of  January 2015, would further restrict oil exports as 
well as the export of  other oil products. 
Leaving aside the current political debate over whether 
new US sanctions should be imposed on Iran or 
threatened in law at this moment in time (when the 
potential for a deal with Iran exists), it is critical to 
consider what impact such sanctions would actually 
have on Iran, Iran’s customers, and oil markets in 
general. Some proponents of  the new sanctions 
legislation optimistically point to the profound success 
enjoyed by the United States and its partners in 
reducing Iranian oil exports in 2012–2013, and they 
argue that additional pressure on Tehran could be 
achieved in 2015 provided Washington gets serious 
about enforcement on oil. Others note that the trend 
of  significant reductions in Iranian purchases was 
already flattening out by the end of  2012, suggesting 
that it would be difficult—absent fundamental changes 
to the oil market or to international views of  Iran—to 
squeeze more water from the stone.
The recent collapse in the price of  oil may indeed 
qualify as a fundamental change to the oil market, 
theoretically freeing those who were otherwise resistant 
to reducing their purchases of  Iranian oil. Similarly, a 
breakdown in talks between Iran and the P5+1 (China, 
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, coordinated by the European Union) 
could create a situation in which deeper cuts to Iranian 
oil exports are diplomatically achievable, assuming 
that a breakdown in nuclear talks is blamed on Iran 
rather than the United States. But even if  sanctions 
are politically possible, there remains an open question 
about the value of  them. This brief  starts with a 
summary of  the sanctions in place on Iran today. It 
then discusses Iran’s current economic status and the 
status of  Iran’s oil sales today. It then examines the 
economic impact on Iran, on Iran’s oil customers, and 
on the market more generally from a further reduction. 
Finally, this brief  concludes with a discussion of  the 
political impact of  further oil sanctions.
Overall, the conclusion of  this analysis is that, although 
more sanctions on Iran may prove to be necessary, 
focusing those sanctions on Iran’s oil sector would be 
insufficient to apply serious pressure and that deeper, 
broader, and more aggressive measures would be 
necessary. That said, this analysis also argues that it 
is possible that—in the footrace between sanctions 
and Iranian nuclear developments—additional 
sanctions may also not prove sufficient to achieve 
a positive resolution of  international concerns with 
Iran’s nuclear program.
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CURRENT SANCTIONS ON IRAN
Although other sanctions programs may have cut deeper into a country’s ability to engage in normal activity 
(e.g., the Iraq sanctions regime in the 1990s), perhaps no other country in history has been the target of  so many 
different, individual sanctions authorities as Iran. This program has emerged as an outgrowth of  both the policy 
responses to Iranian provocations since the Iranian revolution in 1979 as well as sanctioners taking advantage 
of  what the international market could bear over time. The cumulative effect has been a sanctions program 
that is extensive in reach and comprehensive in application. While a longer research paper would be necessary 
to outline the sanctions according to individual statute or national decision, for the purposes of  this piece, the 
below serves as a nonexhaustive description of  particularly relevant sanctions:
•	 Crude	oil: Importers of  Iranian oil and their 
banks are potentially subject to prohibitions 
in their activities with US persons unless the 
country importing Iranian oil has reduced 
its purchases significantly. However, under 
the Joint Plan of  Action (JPOA) agreed to 
by the P5+1 and Iran in November 2013, 
sanctions are being waived by the United 
States so long as purchasers do not increase 
their purchased amounts beyond the levels at 
the time of  the JPOA. This does not include 
purchasers within the European Union, which 
has a general prohibition on the purchase of  
Iranian crude oil.
•	 Other	 petroleum	 products:	 The purchase 
of  any other petroleum product from Iran 
is potentially sanctionable in the United 
States, regardless of  whether reductions 
in the purchase of  these goods have taken 
place. The European Union similarly has an 
import ban on these products.
•	 Petrochemicals:	 The purchase of  
petrochemical products from Iran is 
potentially sanctionable in the United States 
generally, and the European Union similarly 
has an import ban on these products. 
However, under the JPOA, US and EU 
sanctions on Iranian petrochemical exports 
have been suspended.
•	 Financial: Iranian financial institutions are 
not permitted to undertake transactions 
in the United States unless specifically 
licensed by the Department of  the Treasury. 
The European Union, Canada, Australia, 
and other countries have similar lists and 
prohibitions. Further, any transactions with 
a large number of  specific Iranian financial 
institutions (e.g., Banks Sepah, Saderat, 
Melli, Mellat) by any financial institution 
worldwide are potentially sanctionable 
under US law. 
The Central Bank of  Iran is treated somewhat 
differently. Transactions with the CBI are 
permitted so long as they take place 
only in countries that have significantly 
reduced their purchase of  Iranian oil 
since December 2011 and so long as the 
transactions only involve bilateral or 
humanitarian trade. US sanctions could 
potentially be triggered by any other use 
of  CBI funds, including transferring oil 
or other revenues on the CBI’s behalf. 
This provision has been modified under 
the JPOA to permit Iran to repatriate $700 
million per month in restricted assets.
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IRAN’S CURRENT ECONOmIC STATUS ANd  
CRUdE OIl EXPORTS
One of  the results of  the sanctions described above 
(and the many others not cited) is that Iran’s economy 
has steadily deteriorated since 2011.  The deterioration 
picked up markedly in 2012 with the passage of  the 
FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—
which imposed the threat of  sanctions for states that 
did not reduce their purchases of  Iranian oil—and 
its robust enforcement by the Obama administration. 
Both the administration and Congress reinforced these 
authorities with other measures that sought to close 
loopholes and tighten enforcement of  the measures, 
including through the expansion of  the authorities 
to put at risk not just banks but also the importers 
themselves (in Executive Order 13622) and to tie up 
Iran’s accrued revenues in restricted accounts abroad.
The result is that, from 2012 to 2013, Iran’s 
economy cratered. According to the World Bank, 
Iran experienced a GDP contraction of  5.8% during 
those years, and by a further 1.7% in 2013–2014. 
Unemployment hovered around 13% according to 
official statistics—with suspicion abounding that it was 
higher than 20%—and overall economic participation 
figures remained around 37%.  Inflation reached 30–
40%, again according to official statistics.  In 2011, 
Iran was the third-largest exporter of  crude oil in the 
world at 2.4 to 2.5 million barrels per day (million b/d). 
Today, Iran’s oil sales hover between 1.0 and 1.1 million 
b/d. Iran’s total number of  customers also dropped 
from twenty at the end of  2011 to just six: China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. When 
the exports of  condensates and some off-the-books 
Iranian shipments of  crude to the Assad regime are 
added to the equation, Iran presently exports around 
1.4 to 1.5 million b/d. 
Figure 1: Monthly Iranian exports of  crude oil and condensate
(Millions of  barrels per day)
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ECONOmIC ImPACT TO IRAN OF FURThER  
REdUCTIONS IN OIl SAlES
Assuming that Iran’s customers can be convinced to 
reduce their purchases, Iran would suffer significant 
consequences from a further loss in oil sales, but it 
is unclear what near-term impact these consequences 
would have on the overall Iranian economy and 
Iranian decision-making. As mentioned above, current 
sanctions already restrict Iran’s ability to use the money 
it earns from the sale of  its oil. It is obviously true 
that reducing its sale of  oil and related products to 
zero would also decrease its revenue from this sector 
to zero, depriving Iran of  a major source of  national 
income as well as the ability to conduct the only trade 
presently permissible under US sanctions: bilateral 
trade with Iran’s six current customers or humanitarian 
trade. Similarly, it is obvious that any reduction of  
Iranian oil sales adds up to less available funds for the 
government as a whole.
However, there are five key factors that could mute the 
impact of  further reductions in Iran’s export sales: 
1. Non-oil trade remains a viable way for Iran to 
earn foreign currency and, depending on oil 
prices, may equal, if  not exceed, Iran’s present 
crude oil revenues under sanctions. Iran is 
working hard to reduce its overdependence on 
oil as its primary source of  national income. 
Even prior to Rouhani’s election, the Iranian 
government was investing in other industries 
(e.g., the automotive industry) with the 
ambition of  finding new sources of  export 
income and reducing Iran’s vulnerability to 
swings in the oil market. Similarly, Iran sought 
to increase tax collection and to reduce its 
targeted subsidy obligations to shift the 
balance of  its overall receipts and liabilities and 
to minimize the importance of  oil revenue on 
the national budget. This has been reinforced 
under Rouhani and within the concept of  the 
“Economy of  Resistance,” with FM Zarif  only 
the latest official to underscore the importance 
of  getting out from under oil.  
This has been somewhat successful to date. 
According to Iranian customs data from mid-
January, non-oil  trade accounted for $17.7 
billion in total export revenue over the first 
ten months of  the present Iranian fiscal year 
(which ends in March). This includes a variety 
of  goods beyond the usually cited textiles and 
food products, such as cement, which is traded 
widely within the region and in ways that are 
difficult to monitor, police, and sanction. Non-
oil trade’s result for the Iranian economy has 
been quite favorable compared to oil as of  late. 
At $50 per barrel, for instance, Iran’s current 
sales of  1.0 to 1.1 million b/d are only worth 
$1.5 to $1.6 billion per month, against the 
aforementioned rate of  $1.77 billion for non-
oil trade. 
2. The situation looks considerably less dire 
depending on how much oil and related 
products Iran may be permitted to sell even 
under the sanctions. Taking just crude oil aside, 
under S. 269, Iran would theoretically lose only 
30% of  its oil revenues within the first year 
and then reach an unspecified, de minimis level 
by September 2017. At a 30% reduction—for 
example, from 1,100,000 barrels per day to 
750,000 barrels per day—Iran’s revenue from 
oil sales would still be approximately $27 billion 
per year at $100 per barrel and $14 billion per 
year at $50 per barrel.
3. Iran may still be able to sell illicitly. Arguably, 
with oil prices today, there would be scant 
incentive for a major foreign purchaser to risk 
confrontation with the United States to buy 
one or two illicit cargoes. That said, in a crisis, 
the discounts that Iran might offer could be 
of  sufficient value to risk a few cargoes a year, 
and individual smugglers—such as Dimitris 
Cambis, sanctioned in 2013 for his efforts to 
sell Iranian oil illicitly —would see a potential 
benefit of  sufficient scale to try. Economically, 
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such sales would probably not amount to 
much, but in an environment of  an attempted 
oil lockdown, they may be of  some value to the 
Iranian government. Sanctions can respond to 
these transactions, but only after they have 
happened—unless intelligence information 
is extraordinarily good. US sanctions experts 
are skilled at “whack-a-mole,” but even they 
will miss a few cargoes without a complete 
blockade of  Iran.
4. The balance of  trade between Iran and the 
six customers is such that substantial positive 
balances have been built up in China, Japan, 
and South Korea. Indeed, this is one reason 
why, during negotiations on what became the 
JPOA, the United States offered—and Iran 
found attractive—the proposal to permit 
limited repatriation of  some of  these restricted 
assets. It was the only way that Iran could find 
to extricate even a portion of  its held-up oil 
sales. As a consequence, the actual, practical 
economic impact of  further reducing Iran’s oil 
sales—even to zero—may take time to manifest. 
5. Iran has enough money saved up in its 
restricted accounts to keep humanitarian 
transactions flowing, even if  other exports 
were not taking place. Humanitarian trade 
continues to be viewed as a third rail for US 
sanctions policy. Neither the administration 
nor Congress—including in S. 269—have 
proposed curtailing humanitarian trade. Iranian 
trade in humanitarian-related products has 
varied over time. However, according to data 
available from the World Trade Organization, 
Iranian imports of  agricultural products and 
pharmaceuticals have been approximately $10 
to $20 billion per year since 2010.  
As such, current Iranian foreign-held reserves 
could still help them manage humanitarian 
imports for two to four years, assuming Iran 
continued to import such goods at the same 
rate as the previous several years and applied 
all of  its remaining reserves to meeting this 
demand. Maintaining humanitarian trade 
would also help insulate the regime from some 
of  the backlash that otherwise could befall it.
Proponents of  an oil-centric sanctions program would 
likely note that the current Senate bill also would expand 
the reach of  sanctions to include other petroleum 
products, including gas condensates, which—taken 
in combination with reversal of  JPOA relief  on 
petrochemicals—amounts to a $24 billion industry, 
based on latest Iranian customs data. A clampdown on 
these exports would also magnify the overall impact 
of  the sanctions proposed. However, arguably many 
of  the same problems described above—nonzero 
exports even under sanctions and smuggling—would 
still exist for these products. Moreover, such sanctions 
would not address the overall resilience of  the Iranian 
economy and the rising exports of  non-oil goods 
beyond condensates and petrochemicals. 
Table 1: Iranian imports of  agricultural products  
and pharmaceuticals, 2010–2014
(In US $billions)
 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agricultural Products 9.4  11.3  14.0  14.6 
Pharmaceuticals 1.4  1.8  1.6  2.0 
Source: World Trade Organization, Time Series Database.
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ImPACT OF lOWER OIl PRICES
As with any other oil exporter, low oil prices are 
hurting Iran’s overall revenues, but the degree to which 
this may affect Tehran’s thinking is hard to predict. 
Certainly, for the long term, lower revenues will hamper 
Iran’s ability to conduct international trade and overall 
economic development. Similarly, lower prices on lower 
sale volumes would naturally result in lower revenues. 
Doubtless for this reason, Iran has publicly advocated 
that OPEC countries reduce production to help the 
price of  oil to rebound.  But with restrictions largely in 
place on its ability to utilize its oil revenues—with the 
exception of  the modest $700 million Iran is permitted 
to access monthly under the JPOA—the impact of  
lower prices on Iran from an immediate, pressure-
inducing perspective is relatively small. Iran has already 
had to manage its economy on a smaller allotment of  
oil revenue and to adjust its budget accordingly. From 
this perspective, the sanctions on Iranian oil have acted 
as a major price cut already.
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ImPACT ON IRAN’S CUSTOmERS ANd OIl mARkETS
Prior to the recent collapse in global oil prices, there was 
widespread concern that there was insufficient spare 
capacity in global production to make up for a loss of  
Iran’s present exports. Such concerns led Congress to 
include in the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act, 
which set up the oil reduction sanctions, a requirement 
for the president to determine every 180 days whether 
the oil market has sufficient spare capacity to afford 
an Iranian reduction in exports. Indeed, when the 
United States first began to implement its oil reduction 
strategy in 2012, there was wide speculation that the 
president would not determine that there was enough 
supply of  oil in the market to permit the sanctions to 
be implemented. Contrary to these predictions and in 
keeping with the administration’s strong support for 
vigorous application of  US sanctions laws, the Obama 
administration pressed forward with the reduction 
campaign following the president’s determination that 
there was, in fact, sufficient oil in the market. Successive 
presidential determinations led to the same conclusion.
With oil prices far lower than in 2012–2013, the 
expected market impact from losing Iran’s production 
now would be limited. As CGEP Founding Director 
Jason Bordoff  and Harvard University Professor James 
Stock concluded in their recent policy brief, “The 
Implications of  Lower Oil Prices for the US Economy 
amid the Shale Boom”: “while oil prices may not stay 
in the $60s for long, it is reasonable to think they will 
be in the $70s or $80s for the next year or even several 
years, as the market may need to pull off  as much as 
1.5 million b/d of  supply to balance, according to 
estimates by several market analysts.” Such an amount 
of  production neatly fits the volume that could be lost 
were Iran to be cut off  from export markets altogether 
and may suggest that, far from imperiling global oil 
markets or threatening the economic interests of  Iran’s 
oil customers, removing Iran could help balance the 
currently oversupplied market.
This begs the question of  whether Iran’s customers 
would follow the United States (and presumably the 
European Union) in pursuit of  tougher oil sanctions in 
the event of  the collapse of  the negotiating process. As 
noted above, much of  this decision may rest on how 
the talks collapsed and on perceptions of  the quality of  
the offers presented to Iran. 
Taking those issues aside, of  the six remaining 
customers, it is reasonable to assume that Japan and 
South Korea, as close US allies, would support the 
United States in its efforts to reduce Iran’s oil sales 
further. They would likely seek assurance from the 
United States that it would seek similar reductions 
from China, India, and Turkey, but—particularly given 
the drop in oil prices and no expectation of  a return in 
the near term to prices of  $100 per barrel—convincing 
the Japanese and South Koreans that the United States 
was undertaking the necessary effort would not be 
insurmountable. Taiwan’s purchases are sufficiently 
small to not be a major issue. 
For China, India, and Turkey, the analysis is 
somewhat mixed. China has insisted that its 
reductions of  purchases from Iran are the product 
of  diversification of  supply and nothing more. From 
this perspective, it would be reasonable to assume 
that China would prefer to keep some imports from 
Iran ongoing, both to maintain its diversification and 
to demonstrate its independence from Washington 
pressure. As a matter of  government policy, India 
and Turkey have similarly insisted that they will 
not take direction from the United States on their 
energy import policies, but their refiners had made 
the reductions necessary to secure an exception 
to US sanctions until the JPOA was concluded in 
2013. But, ultimately, price played a major role in the 
decisions of  all three importers to remain customers 
of  Iran to date, and the lower prices in the market—
prompted by slumping international demand and 
market oversupply—would help each to decide to 
extricate themselves further from Iran. 
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POlITICAl ImPACT OF FURThER REdUCTIONS  
IN IRANIAN OIl SAlES
Given the economic analysis above, it is reasonable to 
conclude that a sanctions strategy that is focused on oil 
and still dedicated to achieving a diplomatic outcome 
on the nuclear issue may be achievable but could be 
less effective than in the past. Tehran’s customers may 
be willing to part with Iran or at least to further draw 
down their reliance on the OPEC nation as a supplier, 
given oil market conditions. However, Iran’s reliance 
on oil has dropped as a result of  sanctions and a 
deliberate effort on the part of  the Iranian government 
to reduce its vulnerability to oil as a weapon. 
Iran has similarly been doing its best to prepare its 
population for the possibility that talks will collapse 
and promised sanctions relief  will not materialize. 
Iranian national economic planning often comes 
with an inspiring moniker, meant to galvanize 
the population to manage difficult circumstances. 
(This past year was the “Economy of  Resistance,” 
following such others as the “Year of  Economic 
Jihad” in 2011.) It is certainly true that, in the event 
of  further sanctions, Iran’s leaders would once again 
endeavor to bring the population along to support 
it by referencing the history of  Iranian defiance and 
resistance against foreign oppression and invoking 
Shia religious heritage. This may capture some hearts 
and minds, and for those which it does not, Iran’s 
leaders have demonstrated significant capabilities in 
crowd control and in squelching dissent. Over time, it 
is certainly possible that Iran’s leaders could be forced 
to make concessions to get out from under sanctions, 
but this would take time, persistence, and unity in the 
international community to maintain the pressure.
Iran’s efforts to insulate itself  from the effects of  further 
pressure have, ironically, been aided by sanctions in 
two respects. First, as noted above, Iran’s inability to 
access the majority of  its oil revenue in an unrestricted 
manner has already imposed fiscal stringency upon it. 
But, second, international reductions in Iran’s oil sales 
have gone low enough that it is unlikely that future 
reductions would replicate the same dramatic impact 
on the Iranian system. On December 31, 2011, Iran 
was earning approximately $259.1 million per day in 
crude oil sales (using Brent’s oil price on that day of  
$107.97 per barrel). Two years later, when the JPOA 
was agreed to, Iran was earning approximately $118.9 
million per day in crude oil sales, a 54% reduction 
but an absolute loss of  $140.2 million per day (using 
Brent’s oil price on November 30, 2013, of  $108.08 
per barrel). As noted above, Iran’s total oil sales now 
are worth approximately $55 million per day. Simple 
arithmetic demonstrates that the absolute impact on 
a daily basis from further reductions will be less than 
in the past. This analysis can be taken too far, of  course: 
half  of  something that used to be substantial is still better 
than nothing. But taken in combination with Iran’s steps 
to reduce its vulnerability to oil sanctions as a weapon, it 
is possible that the shock value with which oil sanctions 
in 2012–2013 had some of  their most important impact 
on Iranian thinking may be muted.
Moreover, Iran itself  can raise the stakes—and 
historically has—when faced with new sanctions 
pressure. Hamid Baeidinejad, the Iranian MFA’s 
political director and head of  its expert delegations, 
made Iran’s intention to renew this footrace abundantly 
clear in an interview with the Islamic Republic of  Iran 
Broadcasting Corporation in Moscow on February 5, 
when he said: “Iran will certainly go ahead with its 
nuclear program in case of  new US sanctions. We are 
going to install more centrifuges.” 12 Though this topic 
could naturally be the focus of  hundreds of  pages 
of  analysis, even a simple review of  Iran’s nuclear 
advances since 2005—when Iran’s nuclear program 
was first emerging from its suspension negotiated with 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—shows 
this trend:
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Table 2: Iran enrichment advances versus sanctions imposition
Year 13 # of installed 
centrifuges 14
Amount of enriched 
uranium gas stocks 15
Sanctions, laws, or actions from previous year
2005   0 0 E.O. 13382, permitting the imposition of sanctions on WMD 
proliferators
2006 359 0
2007 3,194 75 kilograms (kgs) 16 UN Security Council resolutions 1737 (December 2006) and 
1747 (March 2007)
2008 3,830 630 kgs UNSCR 1803 (March 2008)
2009 4,766 1,653 kgs
2010 8,794 2,770 kgs (3.5%)  
33 kgs (20%)
UNSCR 1929 (June 2010) Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (June) EU sanctions 
expansion (July)
2011 8,970 4,157 kgs (3.5%)  
80 kgs (20%)
E.O. 13590, sanctioning Iran’s  
petrochemical industry
2012 14,070 5,303 kgs (3.5%)  
135 kgs (20%)
FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which 
created the oil reduction structure Iran Threat Reduction Act 
of 2012 (TRA) E.O. 13599, 13606, 13608, 13622, 13628, 
implementing aspects of Congressional legislation, expanding 
sanctions on human rights violators, Iran’s energy sector, and 
those who evade sanctions
2013 20,103 7,154 kgs (3.5%)  
196 kgs (20%)
Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA) E.O. 
13645, sanctioning Iran’s auto sector and exchange of the rial
2014 20,130 7,395 kgs (3.5%)  
0 kgs (20%) 17
13  In general, I chose November for the reporting because 
that is the last month for which we have an IAEA 
quarterly report each year. Picking November permits a 
closer “apples to apples” comparison across years, though 
this chart is purposefully oversimplified to show trends. 
Choosing November also helps to capture the FY12 
and FY13 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
sanctions on Iran, both passed in December, in the year 
in which they had their immediate effects.
14 It is worth noting that the IAEA’s reporting on 
centrifuge installation has become more granular over 
time and that, for several years, the IAEA reported simply 
that certain types of  centrifuges were installed but offered 
no details as to precise numbers. Moreover, given that 
the usual R&D practices involve removing centrifuges, 
reconfiguring them, and similar, the numbers fluctuate 
even within short periods of  time. These figures should 
be taken, therefore, as rough orders of  magnitude.
15  The same applies to UF6 gas amounts. 
16  The IAEA’s report of  November 2007 indicated that 
the IAEA was waiting for results from an inspection to 
be conducted three weeks later. The February 2008 report 
indicated that the total amount of  enriched 3.5% gas was 
75 kilograms in early December.
17  In this case, I took the total amount of  3.5% UF6 as 
reported by the IAEA in its November 24 update, given 
that, as of  the quarterly report, Iran was feeding some 
of  this material into its conversion process line. As of  
the November 7 IAEA report (as corrected), the total 
amount of  3.5% gas was 8,290 kilograms.
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CONClUSION
The question, therefore, is not whether Iran will 
respond to US sanctions pressure, but rather how 
swiftly and to what end. Iran’s moves would, therefore, 
place a premium on truly robust pressure being applied 
in turn if  the United States and its partners are to not 
only maintain parity with Iran’s attempts to create a 
nuclear fait accompli, but also to try to either arrest its 
nuclear advances or force Tehran back into talks. 
The analysis provided in this paper suggests that Iran 
will be more resilient to intensified pressure on its oil 
sector than proponents have hitherto argued, in part 
because the impact of  sanctions already in place will 
continue to hinder Iran to perhaps even a greater degree 
than anything new that could be added. Indeed, the 
fact that Iran is already existing on limited oil revenues, 
due to US sanctions that restrict access to them, may 
help Iran insulate itself  from any future sanctions 
pressure by forcing it to prioritize humanitarian trade 
over other national trade desires. Certainly such a 
reserve would not last forever, and tapping into it, 
without the possibility of  broader foreign trade, would 
have dramatic implications for the value of  the Iranian 
rial, the rate of  inflation, and the quality of  life for 
Iran’s people. But if  this analysis is correct, then a 
strategy of  focusing on Iran’s oil industry will likely 
not result in overwhelming pressure on the regime to 
abandon its nuclear program, at least in the near term. 
The Iran sanctions effort has often been likened to a 
global game of  “whack-a-mole”; if  such a scenario as 
outlined above were to unfold, the better analogy may 
be to a medieval siege. 
A key risk of  such a strategy, of  course, is that it is 
not certain that a nuclear sanctions race would be 
won by the sanctioning side. It is for this reason that 
any decision to terminate the ongoing nuclear talks 
should be informed by the possibility—if  not yet the 
likelihood—that what is on the table now from Iran 
would be improved by additional time and sanctions. 
This may not be the case, and for this reason, the 
author supports moving forward as a general matter 
with a nuclear deal with Iran that—even if  not 
perfect—addresses core US national security interests. 
However, should such a deal not be achievable or 
should the administration and Congress decide to test 
the alternative path of  reentrenched sanctions pressure 
to achieve a better deal in the future, then it will be 
necessary to ensure that the sanctions path is as clear, 
effective, and facilitated by international support as 
possible if  this strategy is to succeed.
In my next policy brief, I will provide some options and 
strategy suggestions on how to approach a renewed 
sanctions effort that goes beyond oil reductions, 
drawing on the analysis presented here.
Issue BRIeF: ImplIcatIons oF new oIl sanctIons on IRan
14 |  center on Global enerGy policy | columbia Sipa
BIBlIOGRAPhY
1  IMF Article IV Staff  Report, April 2014.
2  World Bank Iran Overview, dated September 30, 2014, downloaded on February 17, 2015.
3  IMF Article IV Staff  Report, April 2014.
4  IMF Article IV Staff  Report, April 2014.
5  Krauss, Clifford. August 12, 2014. “With Natural Gas Byproduct, Iran Sidesteps Sanctions.” New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/business/energy-environment/with-a-natural-gas-byproduct-iran-sidesteps-
oil-sanctions.html
6  Tehran Times, February 7, 2015. “It’s necessary to cut dependence on oil revenues, Zarif  says.” http://www.
tehrantimes.com/politics/121620-its-necessary-to-cut-dependence-on-oil-revenues-zarif-says
7 Which does not include petrochemicals or gas  
condensates.
8  Department of  Treasury Press Release, March 14, 2013. “United States exposes Iranian shipping scheme.” http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1879.aspx
9  Data as downloaded on February 4, 2015, from the WTO Time series database entry for Iran.
10  Moghtader, Michelle. January 19, 2015. “Iran sees no OPEC shift toward a cut, says oil industry could withstand 
$25 crude.” Reuters. 
11  McQuaile, Margaret. July 28, 2014. “Iran’s oil exports hold at higher levels as nuke deal extended.” Platts. http://
www.platts.com/news-feature/2014/oil/iran-oil-sanctions/index
12  IRIB, February 5, 2015. “Iran to expand N-program if  US pursues bans: Baeidinejad.” http://english.irib.ir/news/
iran1/item/204207-iran-to-expand-n-program-if-us-pursues-bans-baeidinejad
The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of  Ceyhan. The first barrels of  
crude shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into 
tankers in May 2014. Threats of  legal action by Iraq’s 
central government have reportedly held back buyers 
to take delivery of  the cargoes so far. The pipeline can 
currently operate at a capacity of  300,000 b/d, but the 
Kurdish government plans to eventually ramp-up its 
capacity to 1 million b/d, as Kurdish oil production 
increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of  Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of  operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of  crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

